Datasets¶
| Dataset | What | Size | Licence | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EMBER 2018 (feature version 2) [2] | LIEF-extracted raw features of 1M PE files (800k train incl. 200k unlabeled, 200k test). We train on a deterministic 50 % sha256-prefix subsample of the 600k labelled training rows (--train-frac 0.5), AVClass family labels |
1.7 GB .tar.bz2 (about 10 GB JSONL) |
Data: MIT. elastic/ember code: AGPL-3.0 (not vendored; VITRINE's vectorizer is an independent implementation) |
Training, calibration, test, auto-YARA, clustering, adversarial |
| EMBER2024 Win32 (feature version 3) | pefile/thrember features with capa and packer labels, weekly 2023-09 .. 2024-12; we use a sha256-range subsample (first 8 MiB of each weekly file, 135,423 records, about 7 % of the paper's Win32 split; 43.5 % of the test subsample and 46.4 % of the training subsample are malicious, vs 50 % in the paper; manifest with per-range SHA-256 in results/ember2024_manifest.json, HF revision 3d23efef, thrember commit 0ef753e8) |
15 GB full; 512 MB fetched | Apache-2.0 | Cross-time drift, baseline scoring (released model; ~7 % retrain), capability validation |
Local Windows install (C:\Windows\System32) |
Real, current benign PEs | read in place, nothing copied | Microsoft, not redistributed | Parser verification, benign specificity, domain shift |
No binaries, malicious or benign, are stored in the repo or the dataset folder.
Citations¶
- H. S. Anderson, P. Roth. EMBER: An Open Dataset for Training Static PE Malware Machine Learning Models. arXiv:1804.04637, 2018. EMBER 2017 LightGBM: AUC 0.99911, 92.99 % TPR at 0.1 % FPR, 98.2 % at 1 % FPR.
- EMBER 2018 feature-version-2 release and benchmark model, https://github.com/elastic/ember; the original paper [1] describes only EMBER 2017, and the elastic/ember README points to P. Roth's CAMLIS 2019 talk (slides and video) for EMBER 2018.
- R. J. Joyce et al. EMBER2024 - A Benchmark Dataset for Holistic Evaluation of Malware Classifiers. KDD 2025, arXiv:2506.05074.
- F. Pendlebury et al. TESSERACT. USENIX Security 2019, arXiv:1807.07838. R. Jordaney et al. Transcend. USENIX Security 2017. F. Barbero et al. Transcending TRANSCEND. IEEE S&P 2022. L. Yang et al. CADE. USENIX Security 2021. T. Chow et al. Drift Forensics of Malware Classifiers. AISec 2023. T. Kalný, M. Jureček, M. Stamp. Detecting Concept Drift in Evolving Malware Families Using Rule-Based Classifier Representations. arXiv:2604.22629, 2026. E. Raff et al. Automatic Yara Rule Generation Using Biclustering. AISec 2020, arXiv:2009.03779.
- Mandiant capa, https://github.com/mandiant/capa. Neo23x0 yarGen, https://github.com/Neo23x0/yarGen.