Datasets¶
All data is public threat-intelligence metadata. No malware sample is downloaded, stored or executed.
Files land in $DRAGNET_DATA (default ../../datasets/dragnet next to the repo, else data/raw/),
never in git. python scripts/download_data.py fetches everything (about 640 MB, the byte total of
data/MANIFEST.json) and writes $DRAGNET_DATA/MANIFEST.json (SHA-256, size, retrieval time). The
committed data/MANIFEST.json records the exact snapshot the committed results were produced from.
| Source | File(s) | Size | Version / pin | Licence / terms | Used for |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise | enterprise-attack-19.2.json |
54 MB | v19.2, commit + SHA-256 | ATT&CK Terms of Use (royalty-free, attribution) | profiles, campaigns, software, ground truth (A1, A1-LF, A3, R, G, C, D, F) |
| MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise | enterprise-attack-10.1.json |
31 MB | v10.1, SHA-256 | as above | stale open-world profiles (A2) |
| MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise | enterprise-attack-{12.1 ... 18.1}.json |
315 MB | 7 releases, SHA-256 | as above | campaign union (B1), rolling origin (B2), v14.1 graph (B3) |
| MITRE ATT&CK ICS + Mobile | ics-attack-19.2.json, mobile-attack-19.2.json |
4.1 + 5.8 MB | v19.2, SHA-256 | as above | campaign union across domains (B1) |
| MISP galaxy threat-actor | misp-threat-actor.json |
1.4 MB | commit e9e867f + SHA-256 |
CC0 / BSD-2-Clause | aliases, suspected sponsor state |
| MISP galaxy malpedia | misp-malpedia.json |
3.8 MB | commit e9e867f + SHA-256 |
CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 (Malpedia) | family synonym resolution |
| Malpedia API | malpedia-families.json, malpedia-actors.json |
4.2 + 1.2 MB | live API, SHA-256 in the manifest | CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 (Fraunhofer FKIE) | B3 labels and actor synonyms |
| APTnotes | APTnotes.csv |
0.15 MB | commit 8595fbd + SHA-256 |
index metadata; reports (c) their authors | per-actor reporting depth (F) |
| abuse.ch ThreatFox | threatfox-full.json.zip |
3.9 MB | live export, SHA-256 in the manifest | CC0 | IOC layer (B3), export structure (E1) |
| abuse.ch MalwareBazaar | bazaar-full.csv.zip |
224 MB | live export, SHA-256 in the manifest | CC0; metadata only | imphash (E2) and TLSH (E3) genetics, B3, K |
| trendmicro/tlsh test vectors | tlsh-digests.txt, tlsh-xref-scores.txt |
0.25 MB | commit ebdec8f + SHA-256 |
Apache-2.0 | verifies dragnet.tlsh against the reference implementation (tests) |
| APTMalware hash list | aptmalware-overview.csv |
1.0 MB | commit d71ee9f + SHA-256 |
ODbL 1.0 | hash overlap with MalwareBazaar (K); the samples themselves are never fetched |
Citations¶
- MITRE ATT&CK, "Enterprise ATT&CK", The MITRE Corporation, https://attack.mitre.org; STIX data: https://github.com/mitre-attack/attack-stix-data.
- MISP Project, "MISP galaxy", https://github.com/MISP/misp-galaxy.
- Fraunhofer FKIE, "Malpedia", https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de (API and via the MISP galaxy cluster).
- APTnotes, https://github.com/aptnotes/data.
- abuse.ch, "ThreatFox" https://threatfox.abuse.ch and "MalwareBazaar" https://bazaar.abuse.ch.
- Trend Micro, "TLSH" reference implementation, https://github.com/trendmicro/tlsh.
- APTMalware dataset, https://github.com/cyber-research/APTMalware.
Literature compared against¶
- K. Guru, R. J. Moss and M. J. Kochenderfer, "On Technique Identification and Threat-Actor Attribution using LLMs and Embedding Models", arXiv:2505.11547, 2025, https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.11547 (section G: adapted protocol, not a reproduction).
- J. Oliver, C. Cheng and Y. Chen, "TLSH - A Locality Sensitive Hash", 2013 Fourth Cybercrime and Trustworthy Computing Workshop (CTC), pp. 7-13, doi:10.1109/CTC.2013.9 (Table II: about a 6.43% file-pair false-positive rate at distance < 100; section E3).
- T. Kida and O. Olukoya, "Nation-State Threat Actor Attribution Using Fuzzy Hashing", IEEE Access 11:1148-1165, 2023, doi:10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3233403 (89% average accuracy over the country and APT-group tasks on APTMalware; needs the binaries, so it is not matched - section K counts how many of its hashes MalwareBazaar metadata knows).
Curated real cases¶
dragnet/data/real_cases/*.json are small hand-curated evidence abstractions of documented incidents.
Values that are widely published (WannaCry kill-switch domain, sample SHA-256s, ATT&CK technique
lists) are used verbatim. Where the public evidence is a relationship rather than a value (e.g. "the
Rich header is byte-identical to a Lazarus sample", "code overlaps with Contopee"), the case uses a
descriptive token (rh:bluenoroff-sample-copy) and the matching kg_additions entry cites the report
that established the link. The tokens do not reproduce the original artifacts.